Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal champion - VMS

This is a discussion on Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal champion - VMS ; In article , "Paul Raulerson" writes: >> You think that VMS has high security? Well, it does, but in = >> part, that is security through obscurity. > >Do you mean that since the source listings are only on CDROM ...

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Thread: Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal champion

  1. Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal champion

    In article , "Paul Raulerson" writes:


    >> You think that VMS has high security? Well, it does, but in =
    >> part, that is security through obscurity.

    >
    >Do you mean that since the source listings are only on CDROM these days,
    >VMS security is obscured from those who have only a microfiche reader
    >and no CDROM-capable computer ?


    You know exactly what I meant; VMS is "mysterious" to most of the scripkiddies and PC based hackers out there. But by your standards,
    OS's that have no publically available source *are* more secure. Seen thesource code to AIX hanging about lately?

    > Does it have kernel based firewall capabilities?


    >Your use of the term "kernel based" implies that you are "not from
    >around here". Absolutely the VMS kernel firewalls all communication
    >protocols implemented in the the VMS kernel. That would be SCS, right ?
    >Can you think of any others ?


    Oh brother - DOS/BATCH on a PDP-11 had a "kernel" - as I am sure VMS doesas well. Regardless of how it is structured.

    So where are these firewall protocols available in the VMS kernel? I havenot found any that are not part of the TCP/IP package.


    >> What about third party monitoring tools that meet SOX requirements?

    >
    >If you had been paying attention on DECUServe, you would have read the
    >testimony that SOX compliance means "whatever this year's SOX auditor
    >thinks it means."


    If you were less concerned with being snide and more concerned with reality, you might notice that there are a LOT of packages out there that certify they will pass *any* SOX audit on the system(s) they support.

    And not, a SOX audit does NOT mean "whatever this year's SOC auditor thinks it means", though I can see where someone with *only* and IT exposure to SOX would see that.


    > How about little things like really erasing the data on a DASD unit?


    >What constitutes _really_ erasing is up to your own DAA, which is
    >why VMS lets you provide your own erase pattern. Of course that
    >capability has only been around for the past 20 years or so, and
    >if you are still running VMS V3.0 on your VAX 11-780, you do not
    >have it.


    Well, that's something I did not know - how many passes and is it certified
    by anyone, including the vendor to be really unreadable? Our current practice involve a lot of heat and a bulldozer...


    > Or how about published ways on VMS to handle packet spoofing,
    > tcp sequencing, etc?


    >That depends on which TCP/IP stack you have installed on your machine.
    >If you have complaints about the documentation of that stack, speak
    >to your TCP/IP vendor.


    TCP/IP comes with VMS - most people are not going to replace the distirbuted version of TCP/IP with a third party package. It isn't bad either, but it doesn't handle that kind of stuff. That does not make VMS suitable for embedded work in devices like firewalls.

    Does that say anything bad about VMS? No, it doesn't.


    >> None of them approaches the security level of say, z/OS secured with RACF=

    >
    >(Note to readers who do not follow IBM operating systems - RACF is an
    >add-on product. The security is added on to the operating system.)


    Note to person sending note: RACF is not an add on product, it is just separately licensed - there is quite some little difference there.

    >> That's built in security that goes down to the level of THIS user can see=
    >> THIS field ONLY when logged into THIS terminal and authenticated THIS wa=
    >> y, with full reporting and so forth. And it carries through the entiresy=
    >> stem.

    >
    >Don't those "fields" come from an add-on product as well ?


    Depends- if they are VSAM (which is the the same as RDB on VMS)or on a 3270 BSM screen from CICS, then the answer is they are from "built in" products. If it is a field on a web browser or Java applet, or in a database,then they are from "add on products." Pretty cool that the system based security can extend itself to control "add on products" huh?


    >I gather you have not looked at Rdb security on VMS.


    Perhaps not. I looked at Rdb mainly in relation to how it acts as an indexed file system, not as a database.














  2. Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal champion

    In article , "Paul Raulerson" writes:
    > ----=_vm_0011_W8576932348_10382_1186687216
    > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
    > Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


    Stop doing that.

    > In article , "Paul Raulerson" > @raulersons.com> writes:
    >
    >
    >>> You think that VMS has high security? Well, it does, but =

    > in =3D
    >>> part, that is security through obscurity.

    >>
    >>Do you mean that since the source listings are only on CDROM these days,=

    >
    >>VMS security is obscured from those who have only a microfiche reader
    >>and no CDROM-capable computer ?

    >
    > You know exactly what I meant;


    No, I do not. Admittedly the example I provided was not logical,
    but there was no logical explanation I could ascribe to your comment.

    > VMS is "mysterious" to most of the scripki=
    > ddies and PC based hackers out there.


    But certainly it is not mysterious to foreign intelligence services.
    Serious adversaries have no problem understanding how it works. The
    question is whether with that degree of transparency there are apparent
    weaknesses.

    > But by your standards,
    > OS's that have no publically available source *are* more secure.


    I was not the one trying to link the cost of the source listings
    with the security of the operating systems.

    > Seen the source code to AIX hanging about lately?


    I don't use AIX, so I would not know. Last month I used the VMS
    source listings daily. Some months I do not use them at all.

    > So where are these firewall protocols available in the VMS kernel? I have=
    > not found any that are not part of the TCP/IP package.


    1. Nothing TCP/IP is part of the VMS Kernel. Why would firewalls be ?

    2. As I said before, SCS is the only protocol I can think of implemented
    by the VMS kernel. Can you think of others.

    >>> What about third party monitoring tools that meet SOX requirements?

    >>
    >>If you had been paying attention on DECUServe, you would have read the
    >>testimony that SOX compliance means "whatever this year's SOX auditor
    >>thinks it means."

    >
    > If you were less concerned with being snide and more concerned with reali=
    > ty, you might notice that there are a LOT of packages out there that cert=
    > ify they will pass *any* SOX audit on the system(s) they support.


    I certainly take "third party monitoring tools that meet SOX requirements"
    to mean some requirements that SOX has for monitoring. That would be
    analogous to something that meets NIST 800-53 requirements CA-7, RA-5
    and SI-7. If you merely mean a third party tool that does other
    things but merely does not mess up the security certifications, that
    should be trivial since access to object is controlled by the VMS
    security model.

    >> How about little things like really erasing the data on a DASD unit?

    >
    >>What constitutes _really_ erasing is up to your own DAA, which is
    >>why VMS lets you provide your own erase pattern. Of course that
    >>capability has only been around for the past 20 years or so, and
    >>if you are still running VMS V3.0 on your VAX 11-780, you do not
    >>have it.

    >
    > Well, that's something I did not know - how many passes


    The specifics are controlled by the user site, particularly the pattern.

    > and is it certified
    > by anyone, including the vendor to be really unreadable?


    What constitutes "unreadable" is up to your own DAA, in conjunction
    with the rules that govern them - always jurisdiction dependent.

    > Our current practice involve a lot of heat and a bulldozer...


    If your DAA requires that, then that is what you will do.

    >> Or how about published ways on VMS to handle packet spoofing,
    >> tcp sequencing, etc?

    >
    >>That depends on which TCP/IP stack you have installed on your machine.
    >>If you have complaints about the documentation of that stack, speak
    >>to your TCP/IP vendor.

    >
    > TCP/IP comes with VMS - most people are not going to replace the distirbu=
    > ted version of TCP/IP with a third party package. It isn't bad either, bu=
    > t it doesn't handle that kind of stuff. That does not make VMS suitable f=
    > or embedded work in devices like firewalls.


    If you automatically choose the HP implementation, that is your choice.
    Plenty of other people, including those with security concerns over the
    years, have made other choices.

    >>> None of them approaches the security level of say, z/OS secured with R=

    > ACF=3D
    >>
    >>(Note to readers who do not follow IBM operating systems - RACF is an
    >>add-on product. The security is added on to the operating system.)

    >
    > Note to person sending note: RACF is not an add on product, it is just se=
    > parately licensed - there is quite some little difference there.


    The competitors are ACF2 and Top Secret. The customer can choose any
    of the three, much like TCP/IP implementations on VMS.

    It cannot be the equivalent of a VMS System Integrated Product, because
    the callouts used by RACF are used by one of the other products when
    they are used.

    >>> That's built in security that goes down to the level of THIS user can =

    > see=3D
    >>> THIS field ONLY when logged into THIS terminal and authenticated THIS =

    > wa=3D
    >>> y, with full reporting and so forth. And it carries through the entire=

    > sy=3D
    >>> stem.

    >>
    >>Don't those "fields" come from an add-on product as well ?

    >
    > Depends- if they are VSAM (which is the the same as RDB on VMS)or on a 32=
    > 70 BSM screen from CICS, then the answer is they are from "built in" prod=
    > ucts. If it is a field on a web browser or Java applet, or in a database,=
    > then they are from "add on products." Pretty cool that the system base=
    > d security can extend itself to control "add on products" huh?


    Any add-on product can implement internal ACLs and rely on VMS to do
    the parsing. Rdb is the most prominent worked example.

    >>I gather you have not looked at Rdb security on VMS.

    >
    > Perhaps not. I looked at Rdb mainly in relation to how it acts as an inde=
    > xed file system, not as a database.


    Rdb is not an indexed file system - it is a relational database.

    The indexed file system on VMS is called RMS.

  3. Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internalchampion

    Global note: please use a news client that wraps properly. Mozilla can
    display your posts okay, but the extremely long lines make replying a
    pain in the neck. I had to manually insert line breaks just so I could
    read your stuff. I hate to think what they look like on a text-based
    news client.

    Paul Raulerson wrote:
    > In article , "Paul Raulerson" writes:
    >
    >
    >
    >>> You think that VMS has high security? Well, it does, but in =
    >>>part, that is security through obscurity.

    >>
    >>Do you mean that since the source listings are only on CDROM these days,
    >>VMS security is obscured from those who have only a microfiche reader
    >>and no CDROM-capable computer ?

    >
    >
    > You know exactly what I meant; VMS is "mysterious" to most of the

    scripkiddies and PC based hackers out there. But by your standards,
    > OS's that have no publically available source *are* more secure. Seen the

    source code to AIX hanging about lately?

    VMS is secure. VMS is obscure. Therefore VMS is obscure because it
    is obscure. Sorry, you fail elementary logic. Actually, the
    truth is VMS is obscure because it is secure. :-) (I actually can make
    a better argument for this case. VMS is obscure (to crackers) because
    they don't bother targeting it. They don't bother targeting it
    because it is too hard to crack. Therefore it is obscure because it
    is secure. :-) (Actually, "everyone knows" VMS is obscure because
    of poor DEC/Compaq/HP marketing and because of the black helicopter
    plots against it. On the other hand, VMS is secure because it was
    designed and implemented with security as a goal and not as an
    afterthought.)

    >
    >
    >>Does it have kernel based firewall capabilities?

    >
    >
    >>Your use of the term "kernel based" implies that you are "not from
    >>around here". Absolutely the VMS kernel firewalls all communication
    >>protocols implemented in the the VMS kernel. That would be SCS, right ?
    >>Can you think of any others ?

    >
    >
    > Oh brother - DOS/BATCH on a PDP-11 had a "kernel" - as I am sure VMS does as well.

    Regardless of how it is structured.

    :-) :-) :-) I was just thinking of DOS/BATCH as an example of a secure OS
    while reading a previous post in this thread.

    DOS/BATCH is secure because 1) It doesn't support any networking and
    2) no one at all is running it (that I've heard of in the last 20 years.)
    (I last used it in about 1982, and it was horribly obsolete then.)

    "Kernel" has a very specific meaning in VMS and the only network code
    implemented in the kernel may very well be SCS. You probably meant
    "privileged code" or "inner mode code" or "drivers" or something more
    specific.

    Which begs the question "what are 'kernel based firewall capabilities'?"

    Are you referring to inner-mode IP packet filtering? If so, this is
    inapplicable to VMS since the kernel never sees an IP packet. Any
    and all such filtering would be done in a driver or other privileged
    code running in user context. (The reason for putting this stuff in
    the kernel would either be poor OS design or for performance. If for
    performance, see the security implications of the NT graphics design
    for a horrible example of why this is a really, really bad idea.)

    >
    > So where are these firewall protocols available in the VMS kernel?

    I have not found any that are not part of the TCP/IP package.
    >


    So you are talking about TCP/IP? So you mean something like ipchains
    or whatever? These don't protect the system they are implemented on
    (except incidentally), they protect *other* systems by being implement
    in a router. There absence from any given VMS IP stack doesn't mean
    VMS is insecure, it just means it *may* be unsuitable for implementing
    a TCP/IP firewall. (Or you could write your own code to do the filtering,
    in user mode, on a secure VMS box. I believe DEC did exactly that, many
    years ago. Didn't sell many though, people tend to buy special-purpose
    hardware firewalls for that.)

    >
    >
    >>>What about third party monitoring tools that meet SOX requirements?

    >>
    >>If you had been paying attention on DECUServe, you would have read the
    >>testimony that SOX compliance means "whatever this year's SOX auditor
    >>thinks it means."

    >
    >
    > If you were less concerned with being snide and more concerned with reality,

    you might notice that there are a LOT of packages out there that certify they
    will pass *any* SOX audit on the system(s) they support.
    >
    > And not, a SOX audit does NOT mean "whatever this year's SOC auditor thinks

    it means", though I can see where someone with *only* and IT exposure to SOX
    would see that.
    >
    >


    You seem to be talking about a 3rd party layered application, which has
    nothing to do with whether or not the OS is secure.

    >
    >>How about little things like really erasing the data on a DASD unit?

    >
    >
    >>What constitutes _really_ erasing is up to your own DAA, which is
    >>why VMS lets you provide your own erase pattern. Of course that
    >>capability has only been around for the past 20 years or so, and
    >>if you are still running VMS V3.0 on your VAX 11-780, you do not
    >>have it.

    >
    >
    > Well, that's something I did not know - how many passes and is it certified
    > by anyone, including the vendor to be really unreadable?


    The US DOD.

    > Our current practice

    involve a lot of heat and a bulldozer...

    This method works fine on VMS too.

    >
    >
    >
    >>Or how about published ways on VMS to handle packet spoofing,
    >>tcp sequencing, etc?

    >
    >
    >>That depends on which TCP/IP stack you have installed on your machine.
    >>If you have complaints about the documentation of that stack, speak
    >>to your TCP/IP vendor.

    >
    >
    > TCP/IP comes with VMS - most people are not going to replace the distirbuted

    version of TCP/IP with a third party package. It isn't bad either, but it
    doesn't handle that kind of stuff. That does not make VMS suitable for embedded
    work in devices like firewalls.
    >
    > Does that say anything bad about VMS? No, it doesn't.
    >
    >
    >
    >>>None of them approaches the security level of say, z/OS secured with RACF=

    >>
    >>(Note to readers who do not follow IBM operating systems - RACF is an
    >>add-on product. The security is added on to the operating system.)

    >
    >
    > Note to person sending note: RACF is not an add on product, it is just separately

    licensed - there is quite some little difference there.
    >
    >
    >>>That's built in security that goes down to the level of THIS user can see=
    >>>THIS field ONLY when logged into THIS terminal and authenticated THIS wa=
    >>>y, with full reporting and so forth. And it carries through the entire sy=
    >>>stem.

    >>
    >>Don't those "fields" come from an add-on product as well ?

    >
    >
    > Depends- if they are VSAM (which is the the same as RDB on VMS)or on a 3270 BSM

    screen from CICS, then the answer is they are from "built in" products. If it is
    a field on a web browser or Java applet, or in a database, then they are from
    "add on products." Pretty cool that the system based security can extend itself
    to control "add on products" huh?

    I'm not a mainframer, but I thought VSAM was indexed files, like RMS, nothing
    at all like RDB.

    As far as extending system-based security to add-on to add-on products, ever
    hear of application ACEs? You can use ACLs for anything you want, not just
    files and devices.

    >
    >
    >
    >>I gather you have not looked at Rdb security on VMS.

    >
    >
    > Perhaps not. I looked at Rdb mainly in relation to how it acts as an indexed

    file system, not as a database.

    Still confusing RMS with RDB?

    --
    John Santos
    Evans Griffiths & Hart, Inc.
    781-861-0670 ext 539

  4. Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internalchampion

    >> Depends- if they are VSAM (which is the the same as RDB on VMS)

    No no no...

    VSAM = (part of, the indexed file support part) RMS
    (the deafult VMS file system), more or less.

    VSAM *might* be an add-on the MVS, not sure, but
    RMS is *not* an add-on to VMS.

    >> I looked at Rdb mainly in relation to how it acts as an
    >> indexed file system, not as a database.


    Rdb = DB2, it's *NOT* a file system, it's a DBMS just as DB2...

    Regards,
    Jan-Erik.

  5. Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal champion

    In article <1uMui.6798$vK2.5366@trnddc03>, John Santos writes:
    >
    >
    >Global note: please use a news client that wraps properly. Mozilla can
    >display your posts okay, but the extremely long lines make replying a
    >pain in the neck. I had to manually insert line breaks just so I could
    >read your stuff. I hate to think what they look like on a text-based
    >news client.


    VERY UGLY!

    Not as bad as reading a quoted-printable message from M$ Outhouse but
    still ugly.

    --
    VAXman- A Bored Certified VMS Kernel Mode Hacker VAXman(at)TMESIS(dot)COM

    "Well my son, life is like a beanstalk, isn't it?"

    http://tmesis.com/drat.html

  6. Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal champion

    VAXman- @SendSpamHere.ORG wrote:
    > In article <1uMui.6798$vK2.5366@trnddc03>, John Santos writes:
    >
    >>
    >>Global note: please use a news client that wraps properly. Mozilla can
    >>display your posts okay, but the extremely long lines make replying a
    >>pain in the neck. I had to manually insert line breaks just so I could
    >>read your stuff. I hate to think what they look like on a text-based
    >>news client.

    >
    >
    > VERY UGLY!
    >
    > Not as bad as reading a quoted-printable message from M$ Outhouse but
    > still ugly.
    >


    I did notice in one of my followups in the same thread, I pasted a
    VMS error message that looked fine in the Mozilla composition window,
    but when I read it back, it was one long line. "How do you do, Mr
    Kettle? Allow me to introduce myself. I'm Mr. Pot."

    --
    John Santos
    Evans Griffiths & Hart, Inc.
    781-861-0670 ext 539

  7. Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internalchampion

    Paul Raulerson wrote:
    >
    > OS's that have no publically available source *are* more secure. Seen

    the source code to AIX hanging about lately?

    Seen the source code to AT&T System-V laying about? AIX is that, some
    generations much IBM development later.

    --
    David J Dachtera
    dba DJE Systems
    http://www.djesys.com/

    Unofficial OpenVMS Marketing Home Page
    http://www.djesys.com/vms/market/

    Unofficial Affordable OpenVMS Home Page:
    http://www.djesys.com/vms/soho/

    Unofficial OpenVMS-IA32 Home Page:
    http://www.djesys.com/vms/ia32/

    Unofficial OpenVMS Hobbyist Support Page:
    http://www.djesys.com/vms/support/

  8. RE: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal champion champion champion

    Urk- apologies to all, and I learned something. I have been talking
    about "RMS" not Rdb.

    I was wrong folks!

    -Paul


    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Jan-Erik Söderholm [mailto:jan-erik.soderholm@telia.com]
    > Sent: Thursday, August 09, 2007 5:51 PM
    > To: Info-VAX@Mvb.Saic.Com
    > Subject: Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal
    > champion champion champion
    >
    > >> Depends- if they are VSAM (which is the the same as RDB on VMS)

    >
    > No no no...
    >
    > VSAM = (part of, the indexed file support part) RMS
    > (the deafult VMS file system), more or less.
    >
    > VSAM *might* be an add-on the MVS, not sure, but
    > RMS is *not* an add-on to VMS.
    >
    > >> I looked at Rdb mainly in relation to how it acts as an
    > >> indexed file system, not as a database.

    >
    > Rdb = DB2, it's *NOT* a file system, it's a DBMS just as DB2...
    >
    > Regards,
    > Jan-Erik.



  9. RE: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal champion champion champion

    Eh- not exactly. AIX has more in common with merged version
    that went to mainframes, though roots do trace down to
    AT&T V7.

    And nope- no source code around.

    Apparently though, the source code for VMS is available.
    Someone was talking about it a few messages ago. Seems
    weird to me that it would be out in public.

    -Paul


    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: David J Dachtera [mailto:djesys.no@spam.comcast.net]
    > Sent: Thursday, August 09, 2007 8:28 PM
    > To: Info-VAX@Mvb.Saic.Com
    > Subject: Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal
    > champion champion champion
    >
    > Paul Raulerson wrote:
    > >
    > > OS's that have no publically available source *are* more secure. Seen

    > the source code to AIX hanging about lately?
    >
    > Seen the source code to AT&T System-V laying about? AIX is that, some
    > generations much IBM development later.
    >



  10. Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal champion

    In article , John Santos
    wrote:

    > VAXman- @SendSpamHere.ORG wrote:
    > > In article <1uMui.6798$vK2.5366@trnddc03>, John Santos
    > > writes:
    > >
    > >>
    > >>Global note: please use a news client that wraps properly. Mozilla can
    > >>display your posts okay, but the extremely long lines make replying a
    > >>pain in the neck. I had to manually insert line breaks just so I could
    > >>read your stuff. I hate to think what they look like on a text-based
    > >>news client.

    > >
    > >
    > > VERY UGLY!
    > >
    > > Not as bad as reading a quoted-printable message from M$ Outhouse but
    > > still ugly.
    > >

    >
    > I did notice in one of my followups in the same thread, I pasted a
    > VMS error message that looked fine in the Mozilla composition window,
    > but when I read it back, it was one long line. "How do you do, Mr
    > Kettle? Allow me to introduce myself. I'm Mr. Pot."


    Back when I was using Mozilla, I noticed a tendency to mimic the
    formatting of the message you were replying to.

    --
    Paul Sture

    Sue's OpenVMS bookmarks:
    http://eisner.encompasserve.org/~stu...bookmarks.html

  11. RE: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal champion champion champion

    In article <009d01c7db13$8a1daa50$9e58fef0$@com>, "Paul Raulerson" writes:
    >
    > Apparently though, the source code for VMS is available.
    > Someone was talking about it a few messages ago. Seems
    > weird to me that it would be out in public.


    The source listings shipped with the binaries through VMS 4.x. at
    no extra charge. Then they became available at low cost. Slightly
    later they moved from microfiche to CD.

    The compilable source has always been available at high cost.

    FreeVMS is out there, in source.


  12. Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal champion champion champion

    In article ,
    koehler@eisner.nospam.encompasserve.org (Bob Koehler) wrote:

    > In article <009d01c7db13$8a1daa50$9e58fef0$@com>, "Paul Raulerson"
    > writes:
    > >
    > > Apparently though, the source code for VMS is available.
    > > Someone was talking about it a few messages ago. Seems
    > > weird to me that it would be out in public.

    >
    > The source listings shipped with the binaries through VMS 4.x. at
    > no extra charge. Then they became available at low cost. Slightly
    > later they moved from microfiche to CD.


    I now realise that I was lied to many years ago.

    > The compilable source has always been available at high cost.


    Understood, and acceptable.

    > FreeVMS is out there, in source.


    But unfortunately for me, in C.

    --
    Paul Sture

    Sue's OpenVMS bookmarks:
    http://eisner.encompasserve.org/~stu...bookmarks.html

  13. Re: Wonderful things happen to an OS when it has an internal championchampion champion

    Paul Raulerson wrote:
    >
    > Eh- not exactly. AIX has more in common with merged version
    > that went to mainframes, though roots do trace down to
    > AT&T V7.
    >
    > And nope- no source code around.
    >
    > Apparently though, the source code for VMS is available.
    > Someone was talking about it a few messages ago. Seems
    > weird to me that it would be out in public.


    It isn't. What's available is an abridged collection of compiler
    listings, not pure source code. Some elements (LMF and such) are not
    included to protect IP. No build procedures either, I've heard.

    --
    David J Dachtera
    dba DJE Systems
    http://www.djesys.com/

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