Assuming there's a Linux context to the communique, I'll just follow my
usual rap on tech security systems and their promoters. The big boys who
decide on spending for big programs almost always opt for elaborate
hardware costing tens of billions while overlooking the simplest of
attacks an adversary might employ. Consider: the sat net you infer, with
its rad-hardening, encryption freq. mix, etc...a Chinese orbital pod
(low-reflective) with a crew of two visits each sat in the net and wraps
aluminum foil around it. End of sys.

Defense analysts need to wise up and start defending the country with
common sense instead of dollar signs.

On Sat, 16 Dec 2006 01:30:28 -0500, OSbandito wrote:

> Defense analysts need to wise up and start defending the country with
> common sense instead of dollar signs.

snort.. maybe if one dropped loaves of bread instead of so
many bombs, one's list of friends around the world would be a little
longer, the need for "defending the country" a lot less... food for
thought...

OSbandito wrote:
> Assuming there's a Linux context to the communique, I'll just follow my
> usual rap on tech security systems and their promoters. The big boys who
> decide on spending for big programs almost always opt for elaborate
> hardware costing tens of billions while overlooking the simplest of
> attacks an adversary might employ. Consider: the sat net you infer, with
> its rad-hardening, encryption freq. mix, etc...a Chinese orbital pod
> (low-reflective) with a crew of two visits each sat in the net and wraps
> aluminum foil around it. End of sys.
>
> Defense analysts need to wise up and start defending the country with
> common sense instead of dollar signs.
Buck Rodgers or Flash Gordon may have been able to do such things but in
the real world wrapping aluminum foil around each satellite in a network
would be pretty darn hard. The fuel needed to go from orbit to orbit
alone would be pretty daunting.

OSbandito wrote:

> Assuming there's a Linux context to the communique, I'll just follow my
> usual rap on tech security systems and their promoters. The big boys who
> decide on spending for big programs almost always opt for elaborate
> hardware costing tens of billions while overlooking the simplest of
> attacks an adversary might employ.

[...]

[A nod to Barton L. Phillips' realistic comments.]

What has happened before could happen again. The most likely attacks on
IT infrastructure are rooted in a monoculture of M$ based
proprietary software, incessant new zero-day openings (or anything newer
than 30 days, I guess) and unchecked proliferation of known botnets. This
allows [massive] attacks on the ground-based assets that interface with
and control the space assets and all other infrastructure. By now, this is
simply and easily understood stuff, that could be easily defended against.
There are many smart people watching these things daily. It is still
frequently ignored or insufficiently considered, to all our detriment.

Some governments and agencies are recently embracing open source systems
and software, which in its broadest variety will resist the monoculture
and most widespread zero-day attacks. Consensus is still needed to
immediately and collectively disrupt botnets. Illuminating of satellites
still seems a _way_ secondary threat. But it is apparently a new sign of
how much serious hostility there is in these times. We have been warned.

> Defense analysts need to wise up and start defending the country with
> common sense instead of dollar signs.

Greetings and wishes to a perceived fellow fiscal conservative. I
recommend mr.b's remarks.