This is a discussion on RE: Denial of service when using Active Directory for KDC ? - Kerberos ; Javier, Thank you again. I understand that the use of computer accounts either with ktpass or via another tool (our longer term goal) is the best approach. I am exchanging emails with Markus to find out how to use ktpass ...
Thank you again. I understand that the use of computer accounts either with ktpass or via another tool (our longer term goal) is the best approach. I am exchanging emails with Markus to find out how to use ktpass (short term solution) for computer account creation. I am yet to try his latest suggestion.
We will eventually build a netjoin based utility, which will run on each system instead of on the domain controller. This will be similar to the code you refer to from CSS or provided with Samba, but will be supported by us for our customers to use with our products.
From: jpbermejo [mailto:email@example.com]
Sent: Fri 06/05/2005 10:59
To: Tim Alsop
Cc: Markus Moeller; firstname.lastname@example.org
Subject: RE: Denial of service when using Active Directory for KDC ?
On Fri, 2005-05-06 at 11:28 +0200, Tim Alsop wrote:
> Thankyou. I have a related question for your :
> In order to use a user account which is then used to run ktpass
> against I need to first create the user account (e.g.
I did use that method many months ago, with a 2000 domain. Now, with a
2003 domain I've actually never tried ktpass seriously, and I use either
samba or css_adkadmin. The first one forces node.domain.com into node$
as principal name, where the second allows HOST/node.domain.com. Both
are standar computer accounts as any other windows machine.
You can get a TGT (or any other tickets) for these principals using the
> If I understand it correctly the principal name given when ktpass is
> run is used as an alias, but the account in AD can still be accessed
> using the firstname.lastname@domain format ?
As I don't use ktpass anymore, no alias or mapping to user accounts is
performed. With both samba and adkadmin you can create service
principals, and those are again pure windows service principals (as, for
example LDAP/your.domain.controller). Those principals, at least on the
unix side, are not allowed to acquire tickets (neither tgt nor service
ones), so they cannot be 'denialed' anyway as the keytab is only used to
decrypt tickets from other requesting principals.
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