This is a discussion on Re: [fw-wiz] Ok, so now we have a firewall, we're safe, right? - Firewalls ; -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Well stated, and I understand the issues, but the user can't be held accountable for information the vendor fails to provide or attempts to hide. In these situations the vendor then has graciously abrogated ...
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Well stated, and I understand the issues, but
the user can't be held accountable for information the vendor fails to
provide or attempts to hide. In these situations the vendor then has
graciously abrogated the end users responsibility and maintained it for
themselves. We're not talking about tagging a routing device with enough
decals and warning labels such that it resembles a miniature NASCAR racer,
we're talking about providing the documentation that describe the product
and it 's setup, care and feeding with the fine points of security related
issues clearly located within, as well as in the table of contents, and
within the index. Hard cover manuals are a thing of the past, so getting
the online and CD ready pdf's redone should be minimal expense and
process. Failing to do so moves liability our of the end users realm,
even Marcus would have to agree there.
On Fri, 10 Jun 2005, Dave Piscitello wrote:
> To a great extent, hiding complexity is intentional, and IMO a
> reaction to the scathing criticisms hurled at vendors time and again
> regarding product and UI complexity.
> Some folks on this list recall configuring ISDN adapters and bridge-
> routers, or early V. modems. The survivors from the "your UI bites!
> You can't expect our 10,000 reasonably intelligent users much less a
> consumer to change dipswitch settings and enter command line
> jibberish! We need something *intuitive* and *plug-and-play* or we'll
> take our business elsewhere" era are IMO permanently traumatized into
> believing they can't expose complexity (or they conceded long ago,
> made killings giving the customer what he thought he wanted, and are
> sipping champagne in sunny surrounds while we debate on maillists).
> I feel as if we're arguing over the road *not* travelled
> (distinguished from the road *less* travelled). I'm increasingly
> skeptical that it's possible to go back to the crossroad and make
> "secure" a priority over "easy". Too few people actually care, and
> our culture/society becomes more comfortable each day with solutions
> that absorb and amortize losses rather than mitigate them. Financials
> don't invest in stronger identity theft protection while their costs
> of doing business can tolerate loss. When losses exceed "tolerable"
> they still don't look for something bullet-proof, only something that
> reduces loss to below the magic threshold of "tolerable".
> My experience is that consumers, SMBs, and enterprises don't put even
> this much effort into assessing and mitigating risk. I might be in
> the minority, but the fact that 4 of 5 APs are still run wide open is
> as much an embarrassment to users as vendors.
> Our hands have to be placed on hot (regulatory) coals to implement
> security. Even then we procrastinate and lobby to reduce the
> requirements *and* accountability - and ask vendors to automate and
> hide complexity. Automation and security aren't good bedfellows.
> Where security is involved, otherwise rationale adults devolve into
> whining, rebellious, scheming, negotiating adolescents. The critical
> parent (regulatory) social style isn't working. The nurturing parent
> style isn't working. If you've know a way to create adult-adult
> conversations on the topic of network security, I'm eager to hear
> On 7 Jun 2005 at 3:00, R. DuFresne wrote:
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>>> Good thing I scrolled down to find it! It's pretty well hidden for
>>> a "strong" recommendation. Took me 15 minutes to find, and that's
>>> all I was searching for.
>> I wrote a few papers on wifi products a few years ago, and mentioned
>> that anything at all to do with securing these devices tends to be
>> hidden, if covered at all, and only touched on the the briefest sense,
>> deep down in the documentation. So, nothing has changed in recent
>> times, cool to note the consistency.
>> Ron DuFresne
>> - --
>> admin & senior security consultant: sysinfo.com
>> Key fingerprint = 9401 4B13 B918 164C 647A E838 B2DF AFCC 94B0 6629
>> ...We waste time looking for the perfect lover
>> instead of creating the perfect love.
>> -Tom Robbins
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>> firewall-wizards mailing list
admin & senior security consultant: sysinfo.com
Key fingerprint = 9401 4B13 B918 164C 647A E838 B2DF AFCC 94B0 6629
....We waste time looking for the perfect lover
instead of creating the perfect love.
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