In a somewhat ironic twist of fate,

I was searching on google to try to see what risk management perhaps
had to say about identity theft. (more specifically what types of
financial incentive I might be able to apply to protecting our
organization, to free up funds)

I came up with this... 4th down in the list on google.

Which is one of the companies which got me alarmed in the first place

(it is not a direct correlation, but I thought it was worth a chuckle)


On May 3, 2005, at 2:07 PM, Paul Melson wrote:

> If you mistrust internal users, I think you may be better served by
> looking
> at EAP or some other sort of network access control (gee, I wonder if
> somebody's branded that term... :-) that could address any rogue
> equipment
> or users. It's just as feasible that an outside contractor, a guest,
> an
> untrustworthy employee, or even a cunning criminal could get past
> physical
> security and connect to your wired network and have their way with
> your
> data that way. Even within the parameters of corporate security
> policies,
> this type of thing represents a real threat. All of the network-based
> worm
> exposures I've seen at (insert current employer here) were caused by
> laptops
> brought in by (insert high-profile audit firm, now removed from
> approved
> infosec vendor list here).
> Anyway, nmap -sS -O -p23,80,443 can identify rogues from the wired
> side,
> since it can fingerprint about a dozen different AP types.
> PaulM
> -----Original Message-----
> I am going to have to take a multifaceted approach to this I
> believe, we
> have a very aggressive security posture here, we mistrust our internal
> users
> just as much as external users, and have a very tight filtering
> system, at
> the wire and application level, but I am paranoid, so I will keep going
> further.
> If anyone has any experience with scanners (preferrably open source)
> which
> are good at ferreting out rogue APs I would be gratefull for pointers.
> Again, many thanks to all!

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