This is a discussion on Re: DNSSEC - Signature Only vs the MX/A issue. - DNS ; Have these spoofing attacks been recorded somewhere that can be referenced, e.g. US-CERT? Can you say more about how those attacks could have been mitigated without DNSSEC? Have there been attacks that could only be mitigated with DNSSEC? Of course, ...
Have these spoofing attacks been recorded somewhere that can be referenced,
e.g. US-CERT? Can you say more about how those attacks could have been
mitigated without DNSSEC? Have there been attacks that could only be
mitigated with DNSSEC?
Of course, a spoofing-phishing attack turns into a DoS attack if the host
discards the bogus DNS info but never gets the DNSSEC validated info.
On 12/3/06 9:53 AM, "bert hubert"
> On Sun, Dec 03, 2006 at 08:10:57AM -0500, Ralph Droms wrote:
>> that can be mitigated by DNSSEC are not in the public consciousness like
>> spam or malware or phishing attacks. Do we have documented evidence of
>> specific successful attacks that can be mitigated by DNSSEC?
> Yes, there have been succesful spoofing attacks, whereby end-users end up on
> a different website from the one they thought they were visiting. These
> attacks could have been prevented without DNSSEC however, and any website
> that is truly important uses SSL, which would flag the misdirection (which
> would then be ignored).
> Such spoofing has actually happened a number of times, but hasn't really hit
> the news.
> It is also easy to do, to quote from
> The calculations above indicate the relative ease with which DNS data can
> be spoofed. For example, using the formula derived earlier on a domain
> with a 3600 second TTL, an attacker sending 7000 fake answer packets/s (a
> rate of 4.5Mb/s), stands a 10% chance of spoofing a record in the first
> 24 hours, which rises to 50% after a week.
> For a domain with a TTL of 60 seconds, the 10% level is hit after 24
> minutes, 50% after less than 3 hours, 90% after around 9 hours.
> I've written some tools that perform this action, when you manage to
> saturate the bonafide authoritative servers, success is achieved within
> seconds. Partial saturation means somewhat longer time is needed. The
> calculations above are for the non-saturated case.
>> What is the direct, immediate RoI for the resources I have to commit to
>> providing DNSSEC resolution for names in my zone? My external contacts
>> ("customers") may benefit from mitigation of attacks, but that's an indirect
> They might conceivably worry more over the (inherent) higher reliability
> problems of DNSSEC: there are far more failure modes. This is not DNSSECs
> fault, it is inherent in any protocol that gets encryption added to it.
> This is why I favor (immediate) ameliorization measures, as outlined in my
> draft, which are easy to implement.
> However, recapping, there IS a problem that needs to be solved.
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