>>>>> "Bill" == Bill Sommerfeld writes:

Bill> Outline of an algorithm:

Very neat. So lets think of what countercountermeasures at attacker
might take.

Assume for sake of argument a single client performing the scan.

Instead of performing a single scan, it performs many scans in
parallel, round robbining between them. eg do 1000 scans in parallel,
each staring at different points in the namespace. So now each of my
scans is 1000 times slower, to give the names time to decay back to

You increase your decay timeout in response; I respond by increasing
the number of parallel scans. Who will win? I fear you may hit the
limit of how large you can set the decay timeout without seriously
impacting name resolution performance long before I hit the
implementation limits of this approach, although it's not clear.

Of course, in reality scans by the bad guys are going to be done not
by a single machine, but by armies of zombies each scanning a small
portion of the namespace. But I don't think that makes much
difference to the analysis; each machine is scanning a portion of the
namespace, and it can split that portion into 1000 subportions and
round-robin between them.


to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.