This is a discussion on Time-line for forgery resilience phase #2 - DNS ; The WG has had 2 months to learn about the issues and kick ideas around. At this point the discussion has reach the point of diminishing returns. The discussion needs to become more focused! The chairs propose following plan to ...
The WG has had 2 months to learn about the issues and kick ideas around.
At this point the discussion has reach the point of diminishing returns.
The discussion needs to become more focused!
The chairs propose following plan to make progress:
0. Discussion on namedroppers on ideas without drafts comes to an end.
If you need to ask a clarifying question, please put the tag [CLARIFY] in
your Subject: line.
1. By September 30'th everyone that has ideas they want to share
should have an ID published.
suggested names for drafts: draft-
2. During October the WG will discuss the ideas and recommendations from the
drafts. Editors are encouraged to update their drafts frequently during
this window based on the discussions.
3. During November the WG will select from the ideas on what to recommend as
the extended Forgery Resilience approach.
The chairs plan to have a special session early in the week at the IETF
meeting for interested parties to hash out what makes sense.
Recommendations from that session will be proposed to the WG at
the official WG meeting.
4. If the WG does not reach a rough consensus by late November the chairs
may form a design team to come up with a recommendation.
5. An official WG document(s) will be submitted no later than early
(we will need editors for this document(s))
6. By late January we will have WGLC on the document(s).
The document(s) will be advanced to the IESG by March 1'st.
Based on this plan, please stop all Forgery Resilience (FR)
discussion right now.
If you are not writing down your FR ideas in a draft,
please review and comment on the following WG last calls:
Olafur and Andrew
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